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EVOLUTION, THEOLOGY, AND METHOD 
PART 1: OUTLINE AND LIMITS OF 
SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY 
FERNANDO CANALE 
Andrews University 
Introduction 
During the last 150 years, evolutionary theory has become the standard 
theoretical explanation for the origins of life and the center of a new 
cosmology that other sciences dogmatically assume when developing 
research methods and interpretations of reality. Christian theology, as a 
scientific enterprise, is no exception to this rule. Evolution dismisses 
divine creation as nonscientific myth. To avoid this charge, theologians 
have proposed various versions of theistic evolution and harmonization. 
Thus, the challenge theologians must contend with is whether the only 
choices available to them are mythological faith or scientific truth. 
Further, it is necessary to consider whether a belief in creation necessarily 
entails a sacrifice of the intellect. 
The creation-evolution debate, including the theological attempt at 
harmonization, generally takes place at the level of conclusion without 
taking into account the nature of the processes through which theologians 
and scientists arrive at their respective beliefs. This indicates that the 
problem is not about faith (i.e., religious experience) and science, but 
about the differences between two scientific enterprises-Christian 
theology and the empirical sciences. The process through which science 
arrives at its conclusions is complex. This article will attempt to present 
a brief discussion of the main structures and characteristics of science and 
theology in order to facilitate interdisciplinary dialogue and to help the 
church gain a realistic perspective of the present intellectual situation. 
Therefore, this article will not be an analysis of the teachings of 
evolution and creation, but rather the rational processes that led to their 
formu1ations.l My goals in part 1 of this series are to examine how human 
beings arrive at conclusions and at truth and to examine in what way the 
Bible serves as the foundation of truth.' This will be done by providing 
'This approach belongs to  philosophical research in the area of epistemology and 
hermeneutics. 
'These questions were suggested to me by the organizing committee of the International 
Faith and Science Confeence sponsored by the General Conference of Seventh-day 
Adventists, Ogden, Utah, August 23-29,2002. 
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an introduction to the complex matrix of human rationality and the 
scientific method involved in the conception and formulation of 
theological and scientific teachings. 
- 
I will assess the relationship between evolution and theology from a 
methodological perspective by outlining the rational basis and structure of 
the scientific method. This will be done in several steps. First, in part 1, we 
will examine the pattern through which knowledge is generated and the 
general structure of method. On this basis, we will reflect on the need to 
demythologize science. Next, we will analyze the basic outline of the 
empirical scientific method and consider its outcomes. Finally, we will 
examine some postmodern criticisms to scientific methodology. In part 2, 
I will explore the role that the scientific method plays in the construction 
of evolutionary theory. Part 3 will address the relationship between 
evolution and theology. 
Relational Pattern in Knowledge Formation 
We will begin by analyzing the process through which theological and 
scientific ideas are formed. Thus, we must examine how human reason 
 function^.^ We are used to thinking about concrete objects that we see or 
imagine through constructive models. However, there is another element 
in the process of thought-what we do when we think, i.e., how we come 
to understand something. Scientific and theological methods are founded 
on particular approaches to and definitions of understanding. Thus, it is 
necessary to understand how scientists and theologians come to a 
particular methodological approach to knowledge (reason). 
Reason as Subject-Object Relationship 
All cognitive activities spring from the subject-object relationship, which 
functions as the foundational cognitive unit. Because knowledge always 
takes place as a subject-object relationship, this structural unit is at the 
heart of experience f~rmat ion .~  Experience, then, takes place between a 
cognitive subject (human being) and a cognitive object (whatever falls 
within the intentional consciousness of human beings). Because both 
theological and scientific knowledge fall within the realm of experience, 
they take place within this unit. Further, these types of knowledge are 
formalized, i.e., carefully organized, which helps to differentiate these 
'I use the term "reasonn in a wide sense to include all human cognitive activities. 
4Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuge einw Metapbysik der Erkenntis (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
194 I), 1.5.a. 1; 5.1.1 .a; see also Fernando Luis Canale, A Criticism of ;rheologicul Reason: Time 
and Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral 
Dissertation Series, vol. 10 (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 1983), 27-34. 
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types of knowledge from common knowledge. The process of knowledge, 
then, takes place when the human mind directs itself to an object. 
The Levels of Operation of Reason 
In the generation of human knowledge, the subject-object pattern of reason 
operates in three distinct but interdependent levels: sensory perception, the 
intellect, and reasoning5 Sensory perception allows for information to be 
received from realities outside the human mind. The intellect then forms 
from this information general concepts that allow humans to be able to 
communicate. Reasoning searches for unity and coherence among all 
information received and conceptualizations produced by the previous two 
operations. The scientific method builds on these basic rational operations, 
which are the basis of observation, testability (sensory perception), 
generalizations, hypothesis, law (intellect), and theory (reasoning). 
Immanuel Kant described the organizing drive of human reason (third 
operation). He argued that notions and concepts are organized around 
three guiding centers or ideas. From lesser to greater reach, they are 
human nature, the world, and God.6 Kant describes the function of these 
ideas as "regulative."' These "regulative" ideas arrange cognitions "into a 
system, that is to say, to give them connection according to a principle. 
This unity presupposes an idea-the idea of the form of a whole (of 
copition), preceding the determinate cognition of the parts, and 
containing the conditions which determine h priori to every part its place 
and relation to the other parts of the whole system."8 
What Kant called "regulative" ideas, i.e., the ideas of human being, 
world, and God, I designate macro-hermeneutical presuppositions.9 Kant 
'Aristotle and Kant recognized these levels, but interpreted them in different ways. 
Aristotle's views are known as intellectualism and were used by classical philosophers and 
theologians; see Posterior Analytics, II, 19; and Metaphysics I, 9. Kant's views, known as 
transcendental idealism, became influential in modern times. He believed that "all our 
knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding, and ends with reason, 
beyond which nothing higher can be discovered in the human mind for elaborating the 
matter of intuition and subjecting it to the highest unity of thoughtn (CritiqueofPureReason, 
trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn [Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 19901,189). 
6Kant, 209, states: "It follows that all transcendental ideas arrange themselves in three 
classes, the first of which contains the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject, 
the second the absolute unity of the series of the conditions of a phenomenon, the third the 
absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general." 
'Hans Kiing divides the field of theological interpretation into three separate categories: 
macro- (the study and classification of philosophical issues"), meso- (issue or doctrinal 
was correct in his identification of the ideas and their unifying and 
systematic roles in human reasoning. Due to his modern context, 
however, Kant was not able to perceive that these ideas can be interpreted 
in different ways and therefore can render different results when applied 
as regulative principles. In other words, different interpretations of these 
ideas will produce different rational arrangements of the systematic whole 
of human knowledge. 
Modernity and Objective Reason 
Throughout history, philosophers have debated about how the relative 
function of the subject and object should be understood. Classical and 
modern scientific thinking gave priority to the object by assuming that 
the subject passively receives input from its objects. This emphasis defined 
the notion of scientific objectivity as excluding all contributions from the 
cognitive subject. 
Richard Rorty describes the classical and modern interpretations of 
the functioning of scientific knowledge as foundationalism, the notion 
that the truth of our propositions is determined by "privileged relations 
to objects those propositions are about." Thus, truth is solely determined 
by "compulsion from the object known."1° The myth of science, as 
rendering absolute certain knowledge, builds on the foundationalist 
understanding of knowledge." O n  the other hand, German idealism went 
to the other side, giving maximum priority to the thinking subject, who 
is supposed to create its own objects of thinking. 
However, postmodernity has brought significant changes in definition to 
the subject-o bject relation. During the twentieth century, developments in 
philosophical hermeneutic~~~ and the philosophy of science showed that all 
interpretation"), and micro- (textual interpretation) models (Theology for the n i r d  
Millennium: An Ecumenical View, trans. Peter Heinegg [New York: Doubleday, 19881,134). 
''Richard Rorty, The Minor of Nature, 2d ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1979), 159. 
"For the "myth" of science, see "Demythologizing Science" below. 
12"Philosophical Hermeneutics" is the term for the philosophical discipline which 
studies the human phenomenon of interpretation. Hermeneutics is closely related to 
epistemology in that both study the way human knowledge (reason) functions. The 
disciplinary difference between the two seems to be related to their objects. The former 
studies how we understand historical phenomena. The latter studies how we understand 
natural phenomena. For an introduction to the historical development of philosophical 
hermeneutics, see Raid Kerbs, "Sobre el desarrollo de la hermenkutica," Analogh Filosdfica, 
2 (1999): 3-33. For an introduction to the issues studied by philosophical hermeneutics, see 
Josef Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, PhilosopLy and Critique 
(Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980); and Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical 
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knowledge results from contributions made by both the object and the 
subject,13 both of which perform active and passive roles. 
The debate between classical-modern and hermeneutical approaches 
over the action of the subject and object is particularly notable in regard 
to the creation-evolution debate. Those who continue to assume the 
classical-modern notion of objectivity have been profoundly challenged 
by the development of postmodern philosophical hermeneutics. 
Postmodernity and Hermeneutical Reason 
Hermeneutical reason can be summarized as "to know is to interpret."" 
Contrary to common belief, this does not mean total relativism, but only 
the reinterpretation of the meaning of objectivity. Even though 
hermeneutical reason recognizes the input from the subject's prior 
experience in the formation of knowledge, it also recognizes the decisive 
contribution of the real object to which the subject's mind is addressed. 
In correspondence with the subject-object relation discussed above, 
classical-modern objectivism assumes the existence of an "absolute 
universal truth" independent from the subject's contribution. The 
hermeneutical approach, by way of contrast, allows for conflicting 
interpretations of knowledge. Therefore, because human reason produces 
conflicting interpretations, the hermeneutical approach is better able to 
deal with the problem of the subject-object pattern of knowledge 
formation than the classical-modern approach. 
Conflict of Rational Interpretations 
By making the rationality of conflicting interpretations possible, this 
epoch-making shift does not solve the creation-evolution debate, but 
- -  - 
Hmeneutics, trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976). 
"See, for instance, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer 
and Donald G. Marshall, 2d rev. ed. (New York: Continuum, 1989); and Paul Feyerabend, 
Against Method, 3d ed. (London: Verso, 1993), 51. 
14David Tracy explains the universality of interpretation in the following way: 
"Imerpretation seems a minor matter, but it is not. Every time we act, deliberate, judge, 
understand, or even experience, we are interpreting. To understand at all is to interpret. To 
act well is to interpret a situation demanding some action and to interpret a correct strategy 
for that action. To experience in other than a purely passive sense (a sense less than human) 
is to interpret; and to be 'experienced' is to have become a good interpreter. Interpretation 
is thus a question as unavoidable, finally, as experience, understanding, deliberation, 
judgment, decision, and action. To be human is to act reflectively, to decide deliberately, to 
understand intelligently, to experience fully. Whether we know it or not, to be human is to 
be a skilled interpreter" (Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope [San 
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987],9). 
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places it on different footing. The classical-modern view of reason 
excludes the possibility of conflicting rational interpretations; only one 
rational explanation is possible. Classical and modern guidelines, which 
are generally assumed in the creation-evolution debate, force contenders 
to dismiss the opposing view as rationally impossible. This is because, as 
discussed above, the postmodern hermeneutical view of knowledge 
formation allows for the existence of more than one rational explanation 
of the same issue thereby creating a conflict of interpretations not 
preempted by rational demands. This does not, however, imply that both 
conclusions are "true." Thus, objectivity still reigns in postmodern 
hermeneutical reason. While conflicting interpretations are not ruled out 
as "irrational," the assumption is that only one can be true. Recognizing 
the limitations and historical dynamic of the process of knowledge 
formation, hermeneutical reason admits that it is not always ~ossible to 
identify the "true" interpretation. Postmodern hermeneutics does not 
force contenders to dismiss opposingviews as rationally impossible. Thus, 
theologians are not forced to seek harmonization between creation and 
evolution on rational grounds. Therefore, method might be able to 
achieve what cognitive capabilities cannot. It may be possible that the 
correct scientific approach will produce enough certitude to help 
theologians decide between creation and evolution. 
What is Method? 
Before turning to theological and scientific methodology, an acquaintance 
with the inner structure of method in general is needed.15 This will help to 
organize our thoughts on theological and scientific methodologies and to 
retrieve relevant information from studies in the fields of epistemology," the 
philosophy of science," and theological prolegomena relevant to the 
creation-evolution debate. These studies assume the existence of science and 
attempt to describe its function and to evaluate its grounds and claims.18 
Josi Ferrater Mora suggests that method "follow[s] a certain 'way,' 
15For a brief introduction to the notion of method, see my "Interdisciplinary Method 
in Christian Theology? In Search of a Working Proposal," Neue Zeitschrzji f i r  Systematische 
neologie und Religionsphilosophie 43 (200 1): 366-3 89. 
16"Epistemology" is the name of the discipline that studies the foundations on which 
scientific knowledge builds. For an introduction to epistemology, see Rorty. 
'7"Philosophy of Science" is the name of the philosophical discipline that studies the 
disciplinary matrix of scientific activities. This discipline includes a general approach to 
science, as well as specific approaches to each discipline. 
''This approach was pioneered by Irnmanuel Kant late in the eighteenth century. In his 
Critique of Pure Redson, he studied the claims of mathematics, physics, and metaphysics. 
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6 6 6 ~ ,  in order to reach a certain goal."19 This general and simple 
descri~tion uncovers one of the most distinctive characteristics of method: 
1 
action. If method is the path we follow in order to reach a goal, its 
essential characteristic is activity." As activity, method is repetitive and 
has conditions. Thus, repetition is essential to the notion of method and 
repeated experimentation using the same method should render similar 
results. Less recognized, however, is the fact that conditions are also 
essential to the notion of method. Thus, methodic activity is conditioned 
by the concrete goal(s) it attempts to reach, the data it requires, and the 
ideas it assumes in processing the data and reaching its goals. The goals of 
method are its teleological condition, the data its material condition, and 
the ideas it assumes are its hermeneutical condition. The concrete profiles 
of theological and scientific methods become shaped by the interaction of 
all the conditions. 
In this way, method includes in its essence the major epistemological 
issues that need to be considered when asking how theologians and 
scientists arrive at their conclusions. Familiarity with issues such as the 
origin of reliable information (from the perspective of the object), 
interpretation of the data (from the perspective of the subject), and the 
validity of conclusions and the truth of a belief (from both the perspective 
of the object and the subject), will help us to better understand and 
evaluate the debate between creation and evolution. 
Any analysis of concrete philosophical, scientific, or theological 
methodologies should account for the conditions on which they build 
their conclusions. In the case of evolution, the reliability of its conclusions 
is specifically connected to the assumed trustworthiness of its method. 
The importance of method in theology is also paramount because it 
defines the overall direction, content, and teachings of particular 
theological schools and religious communities in a decisive manner. 
Seventh-day Adventists, for instance, address the creation-evolution 
19Jos6 Ferrater Mora, Diccionario de Filosofh, 5th ed., 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: Editorial 
Sudamericana, 1965), s.v. "method." 
''Bernard Lonergan correctly describes method as "a normative pattern of recurrent and 
related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results" (Method in Theology [New 
York: Crossroad, 19791,s). "There is method, then," explains Lonergan, 4, "where there are 
distinct operations, where each operation is related to the others, where the set of relations 
forms a pattern, where the pattern is described as the right way of doing the job, where 
operations in accord with the pattern may be repeated indefinitely, and where the fruits of 
such repetition are not repetitious, but cumulative and progressive." Consequently, 
Lonergan, 6-25, organizes his discourse on method as an identification and explanation of the 
operations involved in the task of doing theology. John Macquarrie agrees with Lonergan's 
definition of method, but goes on to apply it in a different way to the task of theology 
(Principles of Christian Theology, 2d ed. [New York: Scribner's, 1966],33). 
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debate from personal conclusions that in many ways are dependent on 
studies that other theologians and scientists have made. For this reason, 
it is very important to consider the epistemological basis on which others 
have built the views we come to share or reject. The focus of this article 
is on the process by which theological conclusions and scientific method 
serve as the basis for the construction of the theory of evolution. This 
analysis becomes indispensable when theologians are called to think as 
representatives of the community of faith. It may also help to clarify the 
theories involved, bring an assessment of personal views on creation and 
evolution, and lead to understanding the way in which these relate to the 
entire body of Christian beliefs. 
The Legend 
For at least two centuries, the empirical sciences have enjoyed the unlimited 
prestige and authority that previously belonged to the medieval church. Due 
to the need for answers to perennial questions and a dissatisfaction with 
traditional pMosophical or theological explanations, theologians have turned 
to science for answers. Moreover, empirical science seems to be closer to the 
facts than philosophy and theology; ihus modern and postmodern cultures 
confer to it a higher reliability and authority. Popular culture willingly and 
uncritically accepts as true the pronouncements of a small community. 
Scientists have become prophets; scientific methodology has become divine 
inspiration. For the common man to say that something is "scientific" means 
that it is 
What the general public seems to assume is that the achievements they read 
about in the educational pages of their newspapers and the threads they 
seem to perceive come from a single source and are produced by a uniform 
procedure. They know that biology is different from physics, which is 
different from geology. But these disciplines, it is assumed, arise when "the 
scientific way" is applied to different topics; the scientific way itself, 
however, remains the same.'* 
The notion that science could be wrong, that it is not absolute, or that it 
provides alternative interpretations of the world escapes most, including many 
scientists and theologians. 
According to Philip Kitcher, the most detailed articulation of the 
legend built around science has been provided "not by the practitioners 
but by their amanuenses in history of science, philosophy of science, and 
21Philip Kitcher, TheAdvancement ofScience: Science without Legend, Obectivity without 
Illusions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 3. 
sociology of ~cience."~' However, things have radically changed in the last 
fifty years or so. "Since the late 1950's [sic] the mists have begun to fall. 
Legend's luster is dimmed. While it may continue to figure in textbooks 
and journalistic expositions, numerous intelligent critics now view Legend 
as smug, uninformed, unhistorical, and analytically ~hallow."~' 
The brief description of science provided in the previous section clearly 
dispels the myth of scientific method. According to Laudan, however, this 
description of science is foundationalist, in need of criticism, and is itself a part 
of the legend and myth of science. It affects not only the general public, pop 
culture, philosophers, and theologians, but scientists themsel~es.~~ Thus, it is 
necessary to probe further into the operation of scientific methodology not 
by way of a general description, but by looking at what scientists really do 
when constructing their theories. 
Method in  the Empirical Sciences 
The way in which the so-called empirical sciences arrive at their 
conclusions and the discovery of truth is by way of the empirical or 
experimental method. To say that something is "scientific" means that 
results are achieved through the application of the scientific method. It is 
necessary, then, to gain a working knowledge of the "scientific" method 
through which evolutionary theory has been produced. The scientific 
method applied in the construction of evolutionary theory is a subclass 
or application of the general empirical method of scientific research. 
Consequently, the next three sections will address the structure, 
conditions, outcomes, and postmodern criticism produced by 
philosophers of science. On  this basis, we will consider how the scientific 
method is applied in the construction of evolutionary theory. 
In the area of empirical research, philosophers of science have done 
a remarkable and detailed job. Particularly enlightening is the analytical 
"Kitcher, 4. A staunch defender of evolution, he speaks of "legend" rather than "myth" 
(4-10). 
25Kitcher, 219, notes that "at the heart of Legend is an epistemology articulating the simple 
idea that scientific knowledge rests ultimately on observation and experiment. Much of 
twentiethcentury philosophy, including the versions of logical empiricismthat provide detailed 
articulations of Legend, adopts a static model of human knowledge. Abstracting from the 
complexities of human belief formation one conceives of an idealized knower, in possession of 
a body of evidence statements that represent the contribution of experience, and the project is 
to identlfy the relations that must hold among statements if some are to justlfy others, and 
thereby show how the evidential corpus warrants claims of theoretical science that may both be 
universal in scope and also purport to describe entities remote from sensory experience." 
and lengthy description of scientific research developed by Mario B ~ n ~ e . ~ ~  
Because the purpose is not to describe the steps involved in scientific 
research but to outline the main epistemological structure on which 
scientific methodology operates, I will not follow Bunge's order of 
presentation. Instead, the analysis will be organized according to the 
formal conditions or components that all methodologies must include in 
their concrete undertakings. In so doing, I will only underline the main 
characteristics of empirical methodology as a preamble to understanding 
the "rational" status and scientific methodology of the theory of 
evolution. This will help to highlight the disciplinary differences that lead 
Christian theologians to propose the doctrine of creation and 
evolutionary scientists to propose the doctrine of evolution. 
Both theology and science are rational scientific enterprises. The basic 
difference between them is not that one is rational and scientific while the 
other is not, but rather that both use rationality and scientific 
methodology from different data and both use different interpretations of 
the macro-hermeneutical presuppositions. 
Brief Description of Scientific Methodology 
As argued above, method, at its core, is an orderly activity aimed at 
reaching specific goals. Bunge sees method as "a procedure for handling a 
set of problems."27 Specific sciences and problems may require different 
methods or procedures. When scientists speak of "scientific method" as a 
general designation, they usually refer not to specific disciplinary methods 
or procedures, but "to the whole cycle of investigation into every 
problem of knowledge."" Thus, the main pattern of scientific 
methodology may be summarized in the following activities: ask 
well-formulated and likely fruitful questions, devise hypotheses that are 
grounded and testable to answer the questions, derive logical consequences 
of the assumptions, design techniques to test assumptions, test the 
techniques for relevance and reliability, execute the tests and interpret 
their results, evaluate the truth claims of the assumptions and the fidelity 
of the techniques, determine the domains in which the assumptions and 
the techniques hold, and state the new problems raised by the re~earch.'~ 
These steps take place within an established body of knowledge, from 
*'Mario Bunge, Scientific Research I: The Search for System (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 
1967); and idem, Scientific Research II: The Searchfor Twth (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1967). 
27Bunge, Scientific Research I, 8. 
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which scientists generate problems that require solutions. These solutions 
will eventually modify and/or enrich the established body of scientific 
knowledge, from which scientific research starts. This description points 
toward the need to demythologize popular notions of science, which 
revolve around the idea that science affirms only facts that are susceptible 
to the most rigorous experimentation. Although testability, e.g., 
experimentation, observation, remains a cornerstone of scientific 
methodology, it is only one of its steps. To better understand the complex 
nature of scientific research and the reliability and authority of its results, 
the conditions of research need to be briefly considered. 
The Teleological Condition 
The teleological condition involves the goal and subject-matter of science. 
The "goaln of science relates to the kind of knowledge scientific research 
seeks to achieve through its methodology. The "subject-mattern refers to 
the reality or realities scientists attempt to understand. The latter refers to 
content and scope; the former to form and method. 
According to Bunge, "what factual science seeks is to map the 
patterns, i.e., laws, of various domains of fact." In other words, scientists 
do not attempt to merely describe reality, but to discover its inner 
workings. This specific objective shows that empirical science is not a 
cosmography, i.e., detailed mapping of its events, but "a cosmology, i.e., 
a reconstruction of the objective patterns of events, both actual and 
possible, whereby their understanding and forecast-hence their 
technological control-is made possible.n30 Kitcher explains that "scientific 
investigation aims to disclose the general principles that govern the 
workings of the universe. These principles are not intended just to 
summarize what select groups of humans have witnessed. Natural science 
is not just natural history. It is vastly more ambitious. Science offers us 
laws that are supposed to hold universally, and it advances claims about 
things that are beyond our power to ~bserve."~' Bunge summarizes: "In 
short, there is no science proper unless the scientific method is applied to 
the attainment of the goal of science: the building of theoretical images of 
reality, and essentially of its web of laws. Scientific research is, in short, 
the search for pattern."j2 
The beginnings of science can be traced back to Greek philosophy. In 
modern times, with the advent of empiricism and modernity, the empirical 
"Philip Kitcher, Abusing Science: The Caseagainst Credtionism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1982), 33. 
j2Bunge, ScienttfEc Research I, 28. 
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sciences began a steady process of independence from philosophy. However, 
independence has never been complete. Science still depends on philosophical 
ideas and produces philosophical constructions. This becomes clearer when we 
consider the hermeneutical condition of method and when we reflect on the 
teleological condition or aim of science. As discussed earlier, the ultimate end 
of empirical science is to build a cosmology (or worldview). This was exactly 
the way in which Greek philosophy began and what still forms the goal of 
metaphysics and ontology. The difference between philosophy and science, 
then, is one of method rather than aim. This is important to bear in mind as 
we deal with the conflict of interpretations between creation and evolution. 
By way of its method, science attempts to "reconstruct" reality. Through 
the influence of the Enlightenment, the myth of scientific rationality 
developed. Scientific method was supposed to produce what traditional 
philosophy could not, i.e., the absolute universal truth about reality. What 
becomes evident in a study of scientific methodology is that even modern 
philosophers of science who defend its rationality and are staunch defenders 
of the theory of evolution concede that scientific method does not produce 
absolute, infallible truth, but rather partial approximations. 
Through its method, science proceeds to build progressively truer 
(albeit ~roblematic, and improvable) reconstructions of reality.)' 
"Hence, science cannot have an ultimate goal, such as building a complete 
and flawless cosmology. The goal of science is rather the ceaseless 
perfecting of its chief products (theories) and means (techniques), as well 
as the subjection of more and more territory to its sway."j4 
what empirical science seeks to underGand by way of its rigorous 
research methodology, and the identification of the specific areas of 
knowledge in which scientific methodology is applied, brings the need to 
consider the content and scope of science. Empirical science can be applied to 
any theory that can be tested empirically. As with Greek classicism, 
ontological investigation began with the study of nature and expanded later to 
the humanities. This remains true among the branches of the empirical 
sciences-the sciences of nature, e.g., physics, chemistry, biology, and 
individual psychology, and of the spirit, e.g., sociological psychology, 
sociology, economics, political science, material history, and history of ideas.35 
j51 am using Bunge's preliminary suggestion as an illustration of the general reach of 
scientific methodology (ibid., 23-24). The modern application of scientific methodology in the 
humanities has been seriously challenged by, for instance, Hans-Georg Gadamer (Truth and 
Method). Gadarner's challenge, 4-5, to the application of scientific methodology in the 
humanities came from the teleological condition of method. Because this challenge uncovered 
ideas that led to postmodernity, it also affected the understanding of reason, and through it, the 
EVOLUTION, THEOLOGY, AND METHOD, PART 1 77 
In this study, we are concerned with the application of scientific methodology 
in the natural sciences, particularly in geology, paleontology, and biology. We 
will consider the "products" of science below. But first, we turn our attention 
to the material condition of science. 
The Material Condition 
The question of where scientists obtain their information may be the 
most publicized feature of scientific methodology. Scientists arrive at 
"truth" because they build their conclusions on data they receive through 
sensory perception. This empirical (Greek empeiria, "experience") 
condition is so important that it is used to label the method and the 
sciences that employ it. 
The selection of sensory perception as the source of scientific knowledge 
is required by the teleological and hermeneutical conditions of method. We 
have already considered the teleological condition that the empirical sciences 
use to study the whole of natural phenomena. Consequently, the choice of 
sensory perception or experience as a source of data is necessary in order to 
access reality, i.e., what is real. It is through sensory perception that natural 
and historical entities are revealed to human reason. 
Scientists, therefore, believe that their information originates from "real" 
rather than "imaginary" things. They take for granted that real things are only 
those that can be accessed through sensory perception and/or technological 
enhancement. As will be seen in the next section, scientists implicitly 
presuppose an understanding of what "real" means, i.e., they assume 
ontological ideas.36 In other words, ideas come into science from the side of 
the hermeneutical conditions of scientific methodology. 
The material condition of scientific methodology takes place in two 
modes: tradition and testing, i.e., observation. Thus, scientists obtain 
information from two sources of empirical data. Our brief description of 
scientific methodology made clear that scientific research starts by 
identifying a problem, which has been suggested from the results of 
previous studies. This is an "empirical" source of data because scientists 
access it through sensory perception; but it is not experience or the 
material condition that grounds the truth scientific methodology is 
supposed to grant. The empirical source of information that grounds 
scientific truth comes toward the end of the method when scientists test 
scientific method in the natural sciences. 
j6The ontological assumption of realism is general, without many philosophical 
subtleties. Karl Popper's positivist account of scientific thought extends to realism's 
overcoming the modern turn to the subject (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [London: 
Hutchinson, 1968],93-94). 
their hypotheses.37 This order is required by the goal of science, as 
discussed in the previous section. 
The realization that the conception, formulation, and advancement 
of hypotheses take place before, i.e., a priori, empirical testing helps us to 
discover the pivotal role that tradition plays in scientific methodology. 
After all, scientists construct their hypotheses from questions arising from 
previous scientific teachings. In so doing, they work not from "factsn 
produced by nature, but from "factsn produced by the human spirit, i.e., 
reason. From the viewpoint of content, this characteristic of the scientific 
method appears as the progressive accumulation of scientific knowledge; 
from the perspective of formal communication of content, it appears as 
tradition. Thus, science takes place within an "orthodox" tradition. 
Tradition subsumes all that the researcher brings to the scientific method 
and reveals the existence and operation of the hermeneutical condition. 
Before considering the hermeneutical condition, I would like to 
underline that the basic difference between theological and scientific 
methodologies takes place at the level of the material condition. 
Undoubtedly, it is here that the greatest discrepancy between the 
theological and empirical sciences occurs. Following a tradition initiated 
in modern times by Descartes, Locke, and Hume, scientists dismiss 
supernatural revelation as a source of information on which to build their 
views. This conviction directly flows from the macro-hermeneutical 
notion that only things or events that present themselves to us in space 
and time exist and can be taken as evidence on which to build scientific 
knowledge. Consequently, the existence of God and his revelation in 
Scripture are dismissed as fantasy.38 This summary dismissal flows from 
the fo~ndationalist~~ role scientists confer to empirical testing. In other 
words, science confers "revelatory" status primarily to natural phenomena 
and to historical phenomena only in a subordinate sense.4o This is due to 
the fact that testing hypotheses-the ultimate ground of scientific 
truth-renders its best results when applied to the repetitive cycles of 
nature.41 Coupled to the empiricist foundationalism of science, we have 
the "spiritual" foundationalism of Christian theology. Following Plato's 
"Testing includes, for instance, observations, measurements, experiments (Bunge, 
Scientific Research 1,222). 
j9For an introduction to the notion of "Foundationalism," see Rorty, 155-164. 
*As we will see below, the subordinate position of historical data affects the scientific 
nature and reliability of evolutionary science when compared with the scientific nature and 
reliability of the physical sciences. 
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cosmology, Christian theology has conceived its area of study-God and 
the realm of supernature-as a timeless and spaceless reality, i.e., spiritual 
realm. Modern theology and the empirical sciences agree that religion 
belongs to the realm of timelessness, and science to the realm of space and 
time. By their very nature, the methods of theology and empirical science 
do not conflict because they are mutually exclusive of one another. We 
should not be surprised, then, when scientists dismiss religious experience 
from the realm of empirical science or when theologians see no 
contradiction between the theory of evolution and Christianity. Platonic 
dualistic cosmology continues to survive today because it is able to 
subsume evolutionary cosmology as a valid explanation in the 
spatiotemporal realm. And it does so while retaining a deeper parallel 
timeless-spaceless level for spiritual, i.e., supernatural, realities. Theistic 
evolutionary schemes flourish in this soil.42 Of course, as we will see later, 
Scripture directly opposes Platonic cosmology by not accepting the 
generalized notion that God and religion belong to a timeless, spaceless 
realm. Conflict between evolution and creation can only take place if 
both theories are understood to refer to the same field of reality, i.e., to 
the temporal-spatial realm of ~reation.~' In short, acceptance of the 
Platonic cosmological framework defuses the conflict between creation 
and evolution. We will come back to this issue later when studying the 
way in which Christian theologies relate to evolutionary theory. 
The Hermeneutical Condition 
The hermeneutical condition refers to all the presuppositions required for 
the proper operation of the scientific method. Bunge explains that "in 
general, every problem is posed against a certain background constituted 
by the antecedent knowledge and, in particular, by the specific 
presuppositions of the problemn (emphasis original)." These 
presuppositions constitute the a priori, i.e., the preontological state, of 
scientific methodology. 
Presuppositions may be thought to include the sum total of life 
experience. Under the influence of classical philosophy, the modern age 
understood scientific knowledge to be "objectiven because it was thought 
42See for instance, Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology 
(New York: Macmillan, 1929); and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1959). 
4'0n this, see arguments against conventional thinking on science, presented by Larry 
Laudan, Beyond Positivism and Relrttivism: Theory, Method, and Evrdence (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1996), 223-230. 
44Bunge, Scientific Research I, 171. 
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to be totally determined by the object. To ensure objectivity, modern 
scientists were supposed to divest or purify themselves from all previous 
experience. Personal experience was considered to be subjective bias or 
prejudice. However, when human beings use scientific methodology, they 
make concrete contributions which decidedly shape the outcome of both 
reason and scientific method. This does not mean that science should 
include ~ersonal biases or prejudices. It only indicates, as we shall see, that 
not all prejudices that are brought to science are negative. The scientific 
method requires the use of hermeneutical presuppositions. For this 
reason, we need to recognize and identify them as a condition of method. 
In speaking of scientific paradigms, Thomas Kuhn brings the 
condition of method to the attention of the scientific community. In so 
doing, Kuhn does not create a new condition of scientific methodology. 
O n  the contrary, he only identifies and explains the role that the scientific 
a priori has always played in scientific method. We should not forget that 
the scientific a priori is required to get the method started. It is only from 
the a priori that a problem can be defined and a hypothesis may be 
advanced. The scientific a priori does not originate, as Kant suggested, in 
the cognitive structure of humanity. Rather, scientists acquire these 
presuppositions by belonging to the scientific t r a d i t i ~ n . ~ ~  
The only way to become a scientist is by engaging in formal scientific 
education. According to Kuhn, the part that education plays in developing an 
"ordinary" citizen into a scientist is that it inculcates in students a scientific 
paradigm or disciplinary matrix. Kuhn suggests that takes place by ways of 
"exemplars," i.e., "concrete problem-solutions that students encounter from 
the start of their scientific education, whether in laboratories, on 
examinations, or at the ends of chapters in science texts."" Through the study 
of exemplars, the student is taught to view "the situations that confront him 
as a scientist in the same gestalt as other members of his specialists' [sic] group. 
For him they are no longer the same situations he had encountered when his 
training began. He has meanwhile assimilated a timetested and group-licensed 
way of seeing"" Thus, "by doing science rather than by acquiring rules for 
doing it" students learn "tacit knowledge."" 
45Thomas Kuhn explains that science is "research firmly based upon one or more past 
scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges 
for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practicen (7%e Structure ofScient$c 
Revolutions, 2d ed. [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19701, 10). It is through tradition, 
then, that scientists get their a priori hermeneutical presuppositions. 
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Among the contents implicit in the "tacit knowledge" students 
incorporate into their scientific a priori as a disciplinary matrix are an 
"entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the 
members of a given community."49 This constellation of beliefs includes, 
for instance, symbolic generalizations,50 particular  model^,^' values,12 law, 
theory, application, and instr~mentation.'~ 
This tacit, implicit knowledge that scientists bring to method includes 
various levels of inclusiveness. Because tacit knowledge contributes in the 
generation of the meaning of scientific ~roblems, hypotheses, laws, and 
theories, i.e., the outcomes of science, we can detect macro-, meso-, and 
micro-levels of hermeneutical presuppositions working in empirical 
science. The macro-hermeneutical presuppositions in empirical science 
include the philosophical presuppositions discussed in this subsection. 
Meso-hermeneutical presuppositions might include the disciplinary matrix 
or paradigm of which Kuhn speaks. Micro-hermeneutical presuppositions 
are the specific theories, laws, and problems that generate concrete 
hypotheses in concrete scientific disciplines.54 
In regard to philosophical presuppositions in the method of empirical 
sciences,15 Bunge correctly remarks that "philosophy may not be found 
in the finished scientific buildings (although this is controversial) but it is 
part of the scaffolding employed in their construction."" Earlier, I argued 
that Christian theology includes in its formation an interconnected 
ensemble of macro-hermeneutical presuppositions. Among other things, 
52Values, such as accuracy, simplicity, consistency, plausibility, or preference of 
quantitative over qualitative procedures, are used to judge theories (ibid., 184-186). 
54This categorization in progressive levels of specificity is only an incomplete 
suggestion. In "Paradigm, System and Theological Pluralism," I refer to what I call "system," 
which I identify here as macro-hermeneutical presuppositions. The "system" designation 
properly describes the inner coherence between the various macro-hermeneutical 
presuppositions operating respectively in theology and empirical science (Evangelical 
Quarterly 70 [1998]: 195-218). 
"Due to their generality and inclusiveness, these are macro-hermeneutical presuppositions 
that correspond to the macro-hermeneutical presupposition level operative in Christian 
theology. Since I am not a scientist, I leave others to distinguish between what Kuhn calls 
paradigm or disciplinary matrix and the levels of meso- and micro-hermeneutical 
presuppositions. 
'('Bunge, Scientific Research I, 291. 
they deal with God, human beings, the world, the one and the many (the 
whole), and reason. Scientists assume interpretations on these issues as 
well. Many of the "scientific" interpretations of these issues are drawn 
from philosophy or are created by the philosophical reach of an 
overarching scientific theory. For instance, the evolutionary theory 
becomes the cosmological macro-hermeneutical presupposition of 
empirical scientific methodology. 
Perhaps the broadest philosophical presupposition of science is that 
the entities it studies are real, i.e., have existence outside of the human 
mind (empirical realism). Their reality is presupposed in the grounding 
notion of fact, which is the referent of scientific teaching and especially 
the source of its testing procedures.'' Moreover, empirical realism 
presupposes a spatiotemporal understanding of reality. In this, empirical 
realism radically departs from classical Aristotelian realism.'* Not 
surprisingly, this macro-hermeneutical presupposition requires the 
rejection of classical ontology, including the notions of God and the soul. 
The macro-hermeneutical role that God played in classical philosophy and 
theology is now to be played by nature and history. Thus, the 
immutability grounded by the classical notion of timeless realities, e.g., 
God, soul, essence, ideas, is replaced by ontological determinism. 
Ontological determinism must be presupposed because the aim of 
science is to discover the recurrent patterns of nature in order to predict 
events. For scientific laws to be predictable, natural phenomena must be 
themselves ordered by law. This is assumed on philosophical rather than 
scientific ground. Popper refers to the nonscientific ground of science by 
saying that the belief in the ontological lawfulness of nature is "a question 
which obviously cannot be answered by any falsifiable theory and which 
is therefore 'metaphysical': how is it that we are so often lucky in the 
theories we construct-how is it that there are 'natural laws?'"59 Popper 
answers his question by noting that "regularities which are directly 
testable by experiment do not change. Admittedly, it is conceivable, or 
logically ~ossible, that they might change; but this possibility is 
disregarded by empirical science and does not affect its methods. On  the 
contrary, scientific method presupposes the immutability of natural 
process, or the 'principle of the uniformity of nat~re.'"~' 
58Ariaotelian realism centers around the notion of first substance, which is a composite 
of spatiotemporal (matter) and timeless (form) realities. 
Sbid., 252. Bunge notes that ontological determinism has been seriously challenged by 
the quantum theory "which acknowledges objective chance not only as a trait of complex 
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The articulation of the whole as a complex of many parts is ordered 
in a multilayered pyramid in which the "higher levels are rooted in the 
lower ones both historically and contemporaneously.n61 The main levels 
from bottom to top are the physical, biological, psychological, and 
sociocultural. This presupposition, for instance, requires that evolution 
should be extended from its original biological level to the higher levels 
that it supports, i-e., culture and history. 
The macro-hermeneutical presupposition regarding the nature of 
scientific knowledge has changed through the years and is presently under 
serious scrutiny. This is due to philosophical changes in the interpretation of 
reason, which were brought about during the twentieth century by the rise 
of hermeneutical philosophy and which were popularized by the advent of 
postmodernity. According to Bunge, until the second part of the nineteenth 
century scientists assumed that in principle it was possible "to exhaustively 
know the present, past and future states of any object in such a way that no 
uncertainty about it remains."62 This mythical assumption was replaced by a 
limited knowability, according to which "science presupposes that its objects 
are knowable to some extent, and it acknowledges that some of the limits to 
knowledge are set by the objects themselves, whereas others are 
Until the end of the twentieth century, scientists were theoretical objectivists 
following the modern interpretation of objective knowledge. That is to say, 
they assumed their knowledge was generated only by the objects they studied. 
In practice, however, their use of philosophical and scientific presuppositions 
in the operation of the scientific method anticipated postmodernity. 
Postmodernity revolves around the philosophical-hermeneutical 
discovery that human reason works from historically generated ~ r i n c i ~ l e s  
of interpretation. Because they are historically generated they may change. 
Change in the ~rinciples of interpretation, especially at the macro- 
hermeneutical level, may result in a change of paradigm that subsequently 
generates a scientific r evo l~ t ion .~~  The notion that scientific teachings 
depend on changing rules has caused great upheaval in scientific circles. 
Larry Laudan characterizes the current situation in scientific epistemology 
systems but even at the level of 'elementary' particles, which obey stochastic laws. Whether 
such a randomness is final or will eventually be analyzed as the outcome of lower level fields, 
it is premature to deciden (Scienttfic Research I, 295). 
"Bunge, Scientific Research I., 293. 
@Thomas Kuhn deals in detail with these issues in 7heStructure ofScientificRevolutions. 
as a conflict between traditional positivism and relati~ism.~' The fact 
remains that scientific method uses hermeneutical presuppositions to 
generate its problems, formulate its hypotheses, and test their 
consequences. Even when interpretation, i.e., contribution from the 
subject, is present in every step of scientific methodology, scientists have 
not yet incorporated the hermeneutical turn in their methodology and 
adjusted to its epistemological consequences. 
Outcomes of the Scienttfic Method 
Following the brief description of the main steps involved in the scientific 
method and a description of the conditions involved in its operation, we 
now turn to the outcomes of method. Scientists produce hypotheses, laws, 
and theories. This consideration is important because it helps us to 
understand the epistemological status of the evolutionary "theory." The 
conditions of method work as presuppositions that directly or indirectly, 
explicitly or implicitly, shape the concrete contents and epistemological 
status of scientific outcomes. Let us consider them briefly. 
Hypotheses 
After defining a problem, scientists attempt to solve it by constructing 
and testing hypotheses. An empirical hypothesis may be described as a 
conjecture about certain unexperienced or unexperientiable facts which 
are "corrigible in view of fresh kn~wledge."~~ Thus, hypotheses are 
assumptions about reality we construct in order to explain it. Therefore, 
we may see them as interpretive schemes. Scientists construct their 
hypotheses by drawing, implicitly or explicitly, from the interpretive 
guidance of macro- (philosophical), meso- (disciplinary matrix), and 
micro- (concrete disciplinary context) hermeneutical presuppositions. 
Thus, hypothesis formation is a complex interpretive act because it builds 
on three antecedent levels of interpretive acts and constructions. 
A hypothesis is not a datum; but it should not be equated with fiction 
either. Data and hypotheses share similarities: both result from 
interpretation and are corrigible. Their basic difference is that data are 
actual empirical experiences, while hypotheses are propositions about 
nonexperienced realities. Bunge provides a useful example that may help 
us to visualize the difference between data and hypotheses. 
The information that the needle of a given meter is pointing to the 110 
volt mark is a singular empirical datum: it may be tested by mere ocular 
66 Bunge, Scienttfic Research 1,222. 
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inspection. (In general[,] experiences, either single or in bundles, are 
necessary to corroborate singular empirical data. They are not sufficient, 
though: some theoretical element will always be needed.) That this 
datum refers to an electric current in the meter is no longer a datum but 
a hypothesis. In fact (i) electric currents are inferable but not observable 
and (ii) the hypothesis may turn out to be false, as the meter may be out 
of order, so that its indications may be wrong. 
Finally, hypotheses always say more than the data they attempt to 
explain. This "plusn value of hypothetical thinking tends to build as 
scientific constructions become more complex and involved, particularly 
in the case of such all-embracing theories as evolution. 
Once formulated, scientific hypotheses play a hermeneutical role in 
guiding the researcher in the design of testing approaches and techniques 
that will corroborate or falsify a particular hypothesis. These techniques 
also result from the interpretive constructions of scientists. (At this point, 
the reader should bear in mind that in this section I am drawing mainly 
from Bunge, who is not a postmodern relativist.) If interpretative 
construction is present in the reception of data, the formulation of 
hypotheses, the construction of testing techniques, and their evaluation, 
one wonders why some scientists are so opposed to the postmodern 
conviction that to know is to interpret. 
Laws 
A scientific law is a confirmed hypothesis that is supposed to depict an 
objective pattern. According to Bunge, "laws summarize our knowledge 
of actuals and possibles."67 It would be incorrect, however, to assume that 
scientists arrive at laws by simply testing hypotheses. The process through 
which scientists arrive at laws is more complex. To understand this 
process we need to bear in mind that the search for scientific law is the 
search for sameness in an ever-changing reality.68 
But how do we arrive at a universal law from changing realities in which 
no two individuals are exactly alike? Plato invented a timeless, ontological 
realm that supposedly grounded knowledge in a changing reality:9 withthe 
advent of modern empiricism, Plato's ontological foundation of knowledge 
was rejected. According to the macro-hermeneutical presuppositions operating 
in empirical scientific methodology, only concrete, changing, diverse, 
''Empirical science is the last link in a long scientific tradition that originated with the 
Greek philosophers. While Heraclitus understood the real to be in constant flux as an ever- 
changing river, Parmenides conceived it to be an immutable sphere. 
691n this way Plato became a very influential foundationalist. 
spatiotemporal entities are recognized as objects and referents of scientific 
knowledge. Popper concludes that there are insurmountable difficulties in 
inducing or inferring universal statements from singular ones." If induction 
has problems, perhaps definite techniques for summarizing and generalizing 
data would lead to universal laws. Unfortunately, laws are not the result of 
simple generalization and summary. In the conception and formulation of 
laws, scientists follow a hypothetico-deductive procedure. In other words, 
they progressively invent, imagine, and construct new hypothetical 
generalizations until, through a process of trial and error, they arrive at a 
universal law.71 We should bear in mind that the invention of universal, 
all-inclusive hypotheses are attempts to explain and understand a multitude of 
lower-level hypotheses that scientific research produces over time. These 
attempts are motivated and made possible by the organizing drive of human 
reason described by Kant. Bunge characterizes this drive of human reason 
behind the formulation of universal laws and theories as the "nervous system 
of science."" It is important to bear in mind that in inventing a universal 
hypothesis, human reason selects only a fm traces of a multifarious and 
complex reality." 
To say that a law is a confirmed hypothesis does not mean that any 
or all hypotheses become laws after they are tested and confirmed. Only 
confirmed universal hypotheses can become laws. In order to confirm a 
law we must descend from its "highm level of abstraction and universality 
and through deduction "specify the circumstances under which" its "use 
or test takes place."74 
Theories 
"The work of the scientist consists in putting forward and testing 
theories.m75 In this subsection, we will consider briefly the nature, need, 
formation, and limits of theory. In the next subsection, we will deal with 
the testability of theory. According to Popper, "theories are nets cast to 
'0Popper, 21-29. Bunge is of the opinion that such techniques produce "low level" laws 
because they render only empirical generalizations (Sciattfic Research I, 323). 
71Bunge, Scientific Researcb1,323, explains that "there are no known rules for inventing 
either high level concepts or the law statements that tie them up: unlike the finding of 
empirical generalizations, the creation of theoretical concepts and laws is not a rule-directed 
activity" (see also 346). 
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catch what we call 'the world': to rationalize, to explain, and to master it" 
(emphasis supplied)." Bunge describes the process through which 
scientists arrive at theories in the following way: 
As research develops, relations among the previously isolated hypotheses 
are discovered or invented and entirely new, stronger hypotheses are 
introduced which not only include the old hypotheses but yield 
unexpected generalizations: as a result one or more systems ofhypotheses are 
constituted. These systems are syntheses encompassing what is known, 
what is suspected, and what can be predicted concerning a given subject 
matter. Such syntheses, characterized by the relations of deducibility 
holding among some of its formulas, are called hy~othetico-deductive 
systems, models, or simply theories (emphasis original).77 
One can argue that the difference between laws and theories resides in their 
referents. Laws are hypotheses about an objective, recurrent pattern in nature, 
while theories are hypotheses about broader chunks of reality. Theories are 
not about recurrent patterns, but about complex portions of reality whose 
explanation requires the putting together of existing laws and theories.78 
Scientists go beyond the discovery of natural laws to construct 
theories about large portions of reality. This is because reason compels 
them to  do so. Reason understands the need to connect isolated parts into 
progressively more inclusive wholes. Bunge explains that in science "a 
factud proposition can acquire full meaning only within a context and by 
virtue of its logical relations with other items."" It is not surprising, then, 
that scientists build theories. 
Theories should not be thought of as only the end result of scientific 
reasoning, but also as presuppositions required for the proper operation 
of the scientific method. "One cannot know whether a datum is 
significant until one is able to interpret it, and data interpretation requires 
theories."'O Besides, the formulation of a problem (the first step in the 
application of the scientific method) requires the application of theories.81 
781bid. He states: "'Theory' designates a system of hypotheses, among which law 
formulas are conspicuous-so much so that the core of a theory is a system of law formulas." 
7qbid., 382. Bunge, 382, explains further that these logical connections involve the 
systematization or interconnectivity of hypotheses. "In short, systematization renders the 
meaning of hypotheses more precise and enhances their testability. In addition, it explains 
most of the hypotheses by subsuming them under stronger assumptions (axioms) and 
intermediate level theories." 
'lAs presuppositions, theories guide research and suggest new lines of investigation. 
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Scientists arrive at theories by constructing explanations and by putting 
things together. To say that theories are "constructionsn means that they do 
not portray "literally a real thing, event, or process."" They are not snapshots 
or summaries of things. Instead, they are sketchy and symbolic 
reconstructions of real systems.83 Theories are creations beyond reality which 
are necessary to explain reality.84 That theories are explanations means that 
they are the result of invention and interpretation. "Invention is the kernel of 
theory constru~tion"~~and means that there are no preset rules for theory 
construction. Theories are original creationss6 that proceed by interpreting, 
rather than describing or summarizing observed realities." That theory 
construction results from interpretation means that it "does not proceed in a 
vacuum but in a preexistent m a t r i ~ . " ~ ~  
Finally, theory construction necessarily involves idealization, 
simplification, selectivity, hypothesizing, and the search for discrepancies 
and deliberate departures from truth. Bunge describes the limitations of 
scientific theories in the following words: 
Every scientific theory is built, from the start, as an idealization of real 
systems or situations. That is, the very building of a scientific theory 
involves simplzfications both in the selection of relevant variables and in 
the hypothesizing of relations (e. g., law statements) among them. Such 
simplifications are made whether or not we realize that they amount to 
errors-not mistakes but just discrepancies with actual fact. Moreover, 
this is not a mere descriptive statement concerning actual habits of 
theory construction: it is a rule of theory construction that as many 
simplifications as needed are to be made at the start, relaxing them 
gradually and only according as they are shown to constitute too brutal 
amputations. Such simplifications are, of course, deliberate departures 
from truth.89 
It is important to notice that theory construction is a speculative 
enterprise that searches for understanding, coherence, and explanation at 
the level of ideas rather than at the level of concrete facts.90 This applies 
'*Bunge, Scienttfic Research I, 385. 
88Bunge, Scientific Research I, 449. 
Tbid., 455, where he states: "In the processing of experience and in the invention of 
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particularly to far-reaching theories like evolution. Theories are grand 
hypotheses because they include and connect other lower-level theories, 
hypotheses, and laws. In this process, the search for understanding 
necessarily involves distortion and the possibility of wrong representations 
of the world. Thus, scientific theories, as scientific laws, exist at a high level 
of generalization that is far removed from the realities and processes they 
attempt to explain. 
According to Bunge, "we should know a priori, from an analysis of the 
very process of theory construction, that every factual theory is at best 
approximately true, just because it involves too many simplifications and 
some inventions that are bound to be inadequate to some extent because they 
cannot be fully controlled either by experience or by logic."91 
The way in which theories connect with reality requires a move from 
the process through which scientists arrive at conclusions to the process 
through which they arrive at truth. Let us consider, then, the testing and 
corroboration of scientific theories. 
Testing, Corroboration, and Scientific Truth 
Scientific theories are not a summary of what scientists discover and prove 
through experimentation. The pathway of scientific method "is not from 
data to theory but data to problem, from problem to hypotheses, from 
hypotheses to theory, and back from theory and evidence to a projection 
that can be checked by another piece of evidence-with the help of further 
theories."92 Through the process of theory construction, scientists create 
a coherent explanation of the data available to them, which is invented 
with the help of a particular perspective or heuristic idea.93 Scientists, 
however, want more than merely coherent explanations. Metaphysics 
provides coherent explanations. What distinguishes a metaphysical from 
a scientific explanation of the world is that the former cannot be tested, 
while the latter can. By testing through experiment or observation, 
scientists attempt to falsify or corroborate their hunches, i.e., hypotheses 
- - -  
ideas, most particulars are discarded and the rest are disfigured rather than carefully collected 
and packaged. Precepts, which anyhow are products of analysis rather than raw experiences, 
are mostly discarded in the process of selecting relevant items. And those that are picked out 
become transmuted into ideas, which are in turn anything but faithful reproduction of the 
given. A posteriori we discriminate and sort out the ideas and come to realize that some of 
their component unites-concepts-have no experiential counterpart, this being why they 
have a chance of participating in the explanation of experience." 
'lIbid., 549. 
and theories. Scientific methodology, then, finds its distinctive foundation 
through empirical testing. 
Scientists test their hypotheses and theories, which are abstract 
generalizations far removed from concrete existing realities in space and time 
and that can be neither verified or falsified directly, by deducing from the 
theory a consequence that can be tested by observation and experiment. In 
other words, scientists apply their theoretical construction to reality in search 
of a recurrent reality (event) that can be tested through experimentation. 
Testing, then, is applied to "statements asserting that an observable event is 
occurring in a certain individual region of space and time."94 The results of 
testing determine whether a theory is falsified or corrob~rated.~~ 
For a theory to be falsified, it must first be falsifiable. According to 
Popper, a theory is falsifiable when it rules out at least one typical recurrent 
event in space and time." Actual testing, then, takes place by observation of 
a spatiotemporal body.97 If a theory is falsified, it must either be modified or 
rejected and replaced by a better one. However, according to Popper, theories 
cannot be verified, but only corroborated in various degrees.98 The degree to 
which theories may be corroborated is not determined by the number of 
corroborations, but by the severity of tests to which hypotheses have been 
subjected.% Testing, however, is not beyond interpretation. On  the contrary, 
not only the construction of problems, hypotheses, laws, and theories, but 
also testing, experimentation, and the instruments used in them are 
conditioned by theory and the teleological, material, and hermeneutical 
conditions of method.''' 
The result of this conditionality is significant. It shows, for instance, 
that corroboration of theories should not be confused with truth.''' This 
is so because one expects scientists to explain why their theories are 
supposed to be held as truth. Truth is not claimed for corroborated 
scientific theories. The epistemological analysis of scientific methodology, 
however, reveals that the myth of science as objective, absolute truth does 
not match the reality of what scientists and human reason are able to 
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perform. On the contrary, it shows that 'no theory is unambiguously 
determined by experience."'** Popper helps us to see how limited is the 
corroboration of scientific theories by comparing testability and 
experimentation to structural piles that sustain the edifice of scientific 
theories over the swamp of everyday opinion: 
The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing "absolute* 
about it. Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure 
of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building 
erected on piles [testing]. The piles are driven down from above into 
the swamp, but not down to any natural or "given" base; and if we 
stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm 
ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm 
enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being.lo3 
The piles in Popper's metaphor relate to the empirical base or the 
testing on which hypothesis, laws, and, especially, theories rest. What 
Popper seems to indicate is that empirical testing and corroboration of a 
theory is never final or absolute. Moreover, testing is pursued only until 
the researcher or the community is satisfied. 
Postmodern Criticism of Scientific Method 
By the end of the twentieth century, a select group of philosophers of 
science became increasingly dissatisfied with the general description of 
science (see discussion above). "Prominent among their ranks are Kuhn, 
Feyerabend, the later Quine, the later Goodman, Rorty, and dozens of 
lesser lights."lo4 They submitted the generally accepted view of science to 
criticism, which is not kindly received by many in the scientific 
community.105 The following quotation will give us the general idea of the 
notion of science these philosophers of science are criticizing: 
According to Legend, science has been very successful in attaining these goals 
[attainment of truth about the world]. Successive generations of scientists 
have filled in more and more parts of the COMPLETE TRUE STORY OF 
THE WORLD (or, perhaps, of the COMPLETE TRUE STORY OF THE 
OBSERVABLE PART OF THE WORLD). Champions of Legend 
acknowledged that there have been mistakes and false steps here and there, 
but they saw an overall trend toward accumulation of truth, or, at the very 
least, of better and better approximations to truth. Moreover, they offered 
'OZ Ibid., 144. 
'05For instance, Laudan, 5, sees them as "postpositivists" endorsing "a thoroughgoing 
epistemological relativism about science." 
an explanation both for the occasional mistakes and for the dominant 
progressive trend: scientists have achieved so much through the use of 
SCIENTIFIC METHOD (emphasis original).lo6 
Thus universal, unrestricted, sole authority is given to science over all 
other human approaches to truth about the universe. Not surprisingly, the big 
bang and evolutionary theories have become dogmatically affirmed by 
scientists and accepted by theologians without much discussion. 
The criticism produced by this new line of philosophers is far- 
reaching and goes beyond the limits of this paper. Their criticism of 
science, however, challenges the universality of scientific results. 
Not Playing by the Rules 
Feyerabend contends that when one takes time to review all that is 
involved in the actual methodological procedures used by scientists in 
arriving at their interpretive constructions, one discovers that these 
constructions are not built by playing "by the book," i.e., by generally 
accepted rules of scientific investigation. The "perfect" narrative 
enunciation of a scientific theory hides a lot of cut-corners, pushes 
problems between theory and fact, and makes ad hoc  approximation^'^^ 
that "conceal, and even eliminate, qualitative difficulties. They create a 
false impression of the excellence of our science."lo8 Moreover, in their 
drive to find explanations for the astonishing complexity and variety in 
nature, scientists never follow the rules for evaluating proposed theories 
and even use falsified theories.lo9 It would seem that what guides them to 
accept theories is the feeling of power they receive when attempting to 
'06Kitcher, The Advancement of Science, 3. 
lo7Feyerabend, 49, states: "Wherever we look, whenever we have a little patience and 
select our evidence in an unprejudiced manner, we find that theories fail adequately to 
reproduce certain qmntitative results, and that they are qualitatively incompetent to a 
surprising degree. Science gives us theories of great beauty and sophistication. Modern science 
has developed mathematical structures which exceed anything that has existed so far in 
coherence generality and empirical success. But in order to achieve this miracle all the 
existing troubles had to be pushed into the relation between theory and fact, and had to be 
concealed by ad hoc hypotheses, ad hoc approximations and other procedures." 
'O81bid. 
lo91n our description of scientific methodology we saw that, according to Popper, 
theories must be either falsified or corroborated. However, Feyerabend, 50, remarks that 
"methodologists may point to the importance of falsifications-but they blithely use falsified 
theories, they may sermonize how important it is to consider all the relevant evidence, and 
never mention those big and drastic facts which show that the theories they admire and 
accept may be as badly off as the older theories which they reject. In practice they slavishly 
repeat the most recent pronouncements of the top dogs in physics, though in doing so they 
must violate some very basic rules of their trade." 
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explain the facts of nature. However, Feyerabend also reports that 
"according to our present results, hardly any theory is consistent with the 
facts. The demand to admit only those theories which are consistent with 
the available and accepted facts again leaves us without any theory. (I 
repeat: without any theory, for there is not a single theory that is not in 
some trouble or other)" (emphasis original). 'lo 
Creating Our Own Rules 
In practice, the circular nature of scientific methodology dmourages critical 
thmlung and fosters dogmatism. Feyerabend denounces the existence of 
scientific dogmatism that prevents challenges to the reigning theory. "In 
cosmology a firm belief in the Big Bang now tends to devalue observations 
that clash with it.""' Scientific journals give the round-about to those who 
want to publish ideas contrary to the accepted theory, including evolution.'" 
The reason for this dogmatism is a built-in circularity of reason and scientific 
methodology. Scientific research starts by defining a problem, and problems 
assume the existence of theories. Conversely, when a theory is formulated and 
accepted it generates and influences research. 
The scientific method is a hermeneutically and theoretically guided 
process. Challenges to wide-reaching theories are not welcome because they 
not only disturb the theory, but the entire constellation of other theories, 
laws, and hypotheses that depend on it for their existence. It is much easier to 
accept challenges to less inclusive or influential theories. This shows how 
difficult it is to maintain the critical nature of scientific research. 
Unfortunately, "there is no alternative to the project of using what we think 
we know to appraise the methods which we take to be reliable."l13 
As Kuhn explains, we become scientists by belonging to a scientific 
tradition that passes the rules of the game from one generation to 
another.l14 There is no alternative because reason's operation, the heart 
and engine of the scientific method, requires the application of a priori 
llOIbid., 50. Feyerabend, 39, states: "considering how the invention, elaboration and the 
use of theories which are inconsistent, not just with other theories, but even with 
experimentsJfactsJ observations, we may start by pointing out that no single theory ever agrees 
with all the known facts in  its domain. And the trouble is not created by rumors, or by the 
result of sloppy procedure. It is created by experiments and measurements of the highest 
precision and reliabilityn (emphasis original). 
'"Ibid., 241. 
'lZVerne Grant, The Evolutionary Process: A Critical Review of Evolutionary Process 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 14. 
"'Ibid., 299. 
l14Kuhn, 11-22; see also Feyerabend, 214-237. 
ideas to the objects it attempts to understand and explain. The term "a 
priori" may be interpreted in various ways. Kant defines it as forms, 
categories, and regulative ideas. Others define it to  be hermeneutical 
presuppositions, categories, schemata, patterns, theories, rules of the 
game. Change in the interpretation of the a priori leads to paradigm 
changes both in reason and science. This brings us to the impact of 
postmodernity on the understanding of scientific methodology. 
Universal Rules? 
Scientific results depend on the application of a priori rules, which include 
macro- (philosophical assumptions), meso- (methodological matrices 
involving an entire constellation of scientific rules and procedures), and 
micro- (theories, laws, and procedures that apply to specific fields of 
research) hermeneutical presuppositions. These hermeneutical 
presuppositions involve complex sets of theories and procedures of various 
kinds that are not derived from data or facts, but which are variously 
interpreted by philosop hers and scientists. 
Scientific rationality is about using the "right" criteria, rules, or categories 
to process the data, information, reasoning, and experiments required in the 
operation of scientific research. In classical and modern times, it was generally 
assumed on metaphysical grounds that all human beings, especially scientific 
researchers, worked under the same universal rules. Various metaphysical and 
epistemological theories told "us why our criteria of successful inquiry are not 
just our criteria but also the right criteria, nature's criteria, the criteria which 
will lead us to the truth.""5 Thus, modern science was born when 
philosophers still assumed that the a priori rules of reason (epistemology) were 
universally given to all human beings (foundationalism). 
The demise of classical ontology precipitated by empiricist criticism made 
the modern sciences possible, but, unfortunately, left them without the 
foundations on which claims for universal truth had been grounded. 
Postmodernity is the recognition of this fact.'16 The myth of science, briefly 
put, consists in the illusion that empirical data is a foundation that produces 
the "true," absolute, universal, and totally certain results that the old classical 
metaphysics claimed to reach, but never did because it was too speculative and 
removed from reality. That many scientists still think along these general lines 
'16Jean-Francois Lyotard explains that postmodernity has an "incredulity toward 
metanarratives" (The Postmodem Conditiom. A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and 
Brian Massurni b e a p o l i s :  University of Minnesota Press, 19791, xxiv). He, xxiv, states: "The 
obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most notably, to the crisis 
of metaphysical philosophy and of the university institution which in the past relied on it." 
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becomes apparent in the controversy about the underdetermination of 
scientific theories. In simple terms, can a body of empirical evidence render 
only one rationally acceptable and valid explanation or many? Positivists 
(modernists) argue in the affirmative; postpositivists (postmodernists or 
relativists) argue in the negative. The controversy started by Hume continues 
unabated into the twenty-first century."' 
From scientific practice, as described by Feyerabend, and from 
philosophical reflection, as developed by Heidegger and Gadamer, 
postmodernity has made clear that there are no universal principles on 
which the rational search for truth can be grounded. The principles and 
rules of science are themselves the product of involved and complex 
rational interpretations that change with the passage of time.'18 Thus, 
absolute reason was replaced by hermeneutical reason.l19 Scientists can no 
longer assume a rational approach and or that the application of the 
"rightm rules of the game will render one single, possible explanation of 
reality, especially when the issue is so complex and inclusive as in the 
question of origins. The more complex the facts are the more likely 
various possible rational explanations will emerge.'" 
Conflict of Interpretations or Universal Truth? 
Can we decide between conflicting theories? Modernist positivist 
philosophers of science say, yes, by a correct application of scientific 
methodology, rationality, and with the progress and accumulation of 
scientific knowledge. Postmodernist (postpositivist) philosophers of science 
say no. This debate takes place under the label "commensurability of scientific 
discourses or theories." Thus, this is not a debate about scientific method, but 
about reason in general. Rorty describes commensurability as the ability " to 
be brought under a set of rules which will tell us how rationd agreement can 
be reached on what would settle the issue on every point where statements 
seem to conflict. These rules tell us how to construct an ideal situation, in 
"'For an introduction to the debate on underdetermination, see Laudan, 29-54. 
ll8Feyerabend, 51, states: "The material which a scientist actually has at his disposal, his 
laws, his experimental results, his mathematical techniques, his epistemological prejudices, 
his attitude towards the absurd consequences of the theories which he accepts, is 
indeterminate in many ways, ambiguous, and never fully separated Ffom the historical 
background. It is contaminated by principles which he does not know and which, if known, 
would be extremely hard to test. Questionable views on cognition, such as the view that our 
senses, used in normal circumstances, give reliable information about the world, may invade 
the observation language itself, constituting the observational terms as well as the distinction 
between veridical and illusory appearance" (emphasis original). 
'19This seems to be suggested by Rorty, 315-356. 
"O~or an introduction to the notion of simplicity and its role in science, see Popper, 136-145. 
which all residual disagreements will be seen to be 'noncognitive' or merely 
verbal, or else merely temporary-capable of being resolved by doing 
something further."121 
Those who believe in the commensurability of theories assume that the 
rules to bring about rational agreement exist and are accepted by all merely 
because humans are rational beings. In this scenario, only one theory is 
rational. The rest are "irrational," or as Rorty says, "noncognitive." To agree 
is to be rational; to disagree with the consensus is to be "irrational." I think 
most scientists and theologians believe that there is only one rational 
explanation for every problem. It is from this meso-hermeneutical 
presupposition that the relation between evolution and creation is addressed. 
Since there can be only one possible rational explanation, any possible answer 
must, therefore, be false or true. Scientific methodology, being rational, is able 
to decide whether an explanation is true or false. The decision is made on the 
basis of universal, rational rules of the rational-scientific game. In our case, 
scientists advancing evolutionary theory dismiss creation as nonrational.12' 
Since creation is based on supernatural revelation, it infringes upon the 
material condition of method and, therefore, cannot be rational. If it is not 
rational, then it is not true either. 
Those who believe in the incommensurability of theories assume as 
evident that there are no general rules of rationality binding all human 
nature.123 They are convinced that rational rules are determined by 
conventional consensus among human beings and are transmitted through 
tradition and education. Since there are no general rules that bind all 
human beings together, there is no rational agreement between traditions 
that work under different sets of rational rules. So neither creation nor 
evolution can be considered irrational; both are rational, but work under 
different rules of rationality and method. Neither can be dismissed as 
"irrational" or "unscientific." In the case of conflict between theories, 
postmodern philosophy asserts that reason cannot help us to decide 
between them. This is because reason has no parameters or rules that may 
serve as glides in the decision-making process. Reason can only help us to 
lZZIn contrast to the methods of science, "the methods and claims of creationists are not 
subject to experimentation, prediction, revision, or falsification. To them, these pursuits are 
irrelevant, because they believe they possess the 'truth' as set forth in the Bible" (Berra, 4). 
12'Laudan, 6-14, deals with incommensurability at a linguistic level which challenges the 
translation and comparison of contents of rival theories. He correctly argues in favor of 
translation and comparison. The ultimate problem, however, is how to decide between 
conflicting theories once we have compared them. The problem between creationism and 
evolutionism is not about translation or comparison, but about truth. Can the truth be 
decided on the basis of reasoning and interpretation? 
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interpret reality, but it may not decide between the interpretations it 
helped us to produce. 
In many cases, theories are incommensurable. However, this does not 
mean that we cannot decide which theory is true. It means only that we 
cannot decide on a rational basis. There are other ways besides reason that 
we can take to decide between theories. Postmodernity only reveals 
rational incommensurability. We cannot decide the truth about theory 
from a set of scientific rules of interpretation and make decisions about 
what is truth. Yet, scientific method has more than merely rational rules 
of interpretation. Rules of interpretation are, simply, the contributions 
from the side of the subject in the subject-object relationship. But 
knowledge and scientific method also have contributions from the side of 
the object. So, scientific theories are incommensz~rable from the side of the 
subject (rational rules), but commensurable from the side of the object, 
which reason attempts to interpret. Thus, creation and evolution are 
incommensurable from the side of the rules of the game they operate 
under (the conditions of method), but are commensurable from the 
perspective of the reality they attempt to interpret, e.g., the origin of the 
universe and life on earth. The decision to adopt one theory over another, 
then, does not flow from the rational rules of the game, but from the 
- 
relation of theory and reality. In this way, we come back to the complex 
issues of verifiability, corroboration, and the testing of scientific 
t h e ~ r i e s . ' ~ ~  
Reason and science can only produce conflicting interpretations, not 
universal truths that all human beings are bound to accept merely because 
humans are rational beings. Moreover, reason cannot help us to decide 
between conflicting interpretations. But a choice must be made, otherwise 
theory-oriented scientific method cannot operate. Use of a theory implicitly 
implies a belief in its truthfulness. Since we do not choose on the basis of 
universal, rational truth, choices always involve faith. With the passage of 
time, choices become immovable scientific dogmas, especially when used to 
understand other aspects of reality. This happens in science, particularly in the 
case of the interpretation of the origins of the universe and life. Changes in 
all-inclusive issues impact the entire field of scientific studies. 
The general description of scientific methodology provided above 
clearly dispels the popular myth of science as an infallible instrument for 
'24This is a very complex issue. Since scientific testing does not take place outside of theory 
but from theory and reason, it is not clear whether an "impartial" decision can be consistently 
reached, especially in macro-hermeneutical issues. Accordingto Kuhn, one of the "bad boys" in the 
philosophy of science, changes in macro-hermeneutical issues are possible, but take long periods of 
time and occur within the dynamics of hermeneutics and history. They do not result from the 
unprejudced use of reason or scientific methodology (Kuhn, 1G11). 
discovering absolute truth. Postmodernism has brought down the myth 
of reason as the absolute arbiter of what truth is. Recent criticism of 
scientific methodology has shown the historical-hermeneutical component 
of scientific methodology and its dependence on tradition and authority. 
In Feyerabend's words, "science is not sacrosanct."125 However in Western 
society, the myth persists, probably due to the need to find answers to 
perennial questions and the willingness to accept as final the theories of 
science rather than traditional philosophical or theological explanations. 
Because empirical science seems to be closer to the facts than philosophy 
and theology, our culture confers to it a higher reliability and authority. 
For theology, these philosophical developments mean that a theology 
based on the principle of soh Scrzptura is not irrational. The counterpart to 
what scientists call speculation or guess in creating and building a 
comprehensive evolutionary worldview, is what Scripture calls divine 
inspiration. Evolution stands as the rational explanation produced by the 
scientific community in the Western world, while biblical inspiration stands 
as the rational explanation of the community of faith received from God by 
way of divine revelation and inspiration. Certainly, from a rational 
perspective, these two theories are incommensurable. From the perspective of 
the reality they explain, however, they are commensurable. Because they 
explain the same reality in opposite ways, they stand in conflict. And we are 
compelled to choose between them because the functioning of reason and 
scientific methodology requires we assume a specific cosmology. Yet, because 
reason has no universal rules, choices of cosmology stand on faith, not only 
in theology, but also in empirical science. Thus, reason does not force 
Adventism, for instance, to adapt the biblical account of creation to an 
evolutionary explanation in order to safeguard its rationality. 
Conclusion 
We have so far described the major components involved in the method 
on which the prestige of science and the authority of the evolutionary 
theory is built. As the church considers how to relate to evolution, it is 
important to have in mind a general picture of science. The description 
presented in this article has been based primarily on Bunge's description 
and Popper's focused analysis. I would like to conclude this discussion of 
the scientific method with Popper's conclusions. 
The analysis of scientific methodology as a general research model 
reveals some important characteristics that should be considered when 
approaching the science-theology relation and the question of origins. 
(I) Science does not produce absolute truth. The application of the 
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scientific method does not produce absolute final discovery of truth, but 
helps us to wrestle with the constant task of interpreting reality. "Science 
is not a system of certain, or well-established, statements; nor is it a system 
which steadily advances towards a state of finality. Our  science is not 
knowledge (episteme): it can never claim to have attained truth, or even to  
be a substitute for it, such as probability. . . . W e  do not know: we can only 
guess. And our guesses are guided by the unscientific, the metaphysical 
(though biologically explicable) faith in laws, in regularities which we can 
uncover-discover" (emphasis original). 12' 
(2) Science is not dogmatic. The dogmatic use of scientific conclusions, 
therefore, goes against the method and spirit of science. 
Once put forward, none of our "anticipations" are dogmatically upheld. 
Our method of research is not to defend them, in order to prove how 
right we were. On the contrary, we try to overthrow them. Using all 
the weapons of our logical, mathematical, and technical armory, we try 
to prove that our anticipations were false-in order to put forward, in 
their stead, new unjustified and unjustifiable anticipations, new "rash 
and premature prejudicesn, as Bacon derisively called them.lZ7 
(3) To do science is to interpret. Scientific method does not proceed by 
way of discovering absolute truth in empirical facts, but by way of 
interpretation, construction of explanations, bold ideas, and speculation. 
"Out of uninterpreted sense-experiences science cannot be distilled, no 
matter how industriously we gather and sort them. Bold ideas, unjustified 
anticipations, and speculative thought, are our only means for interpreting 
nature: our only organon, our only instrument for grasping her."lz8 
(4) Science as interpetation requires scientific a priories. This becomes 
apparent when we deal with the hermeneutical condition of method. "Even 
the careful and sober testing of our ideas by experience is in its turn inspired 
by ideas: experiment is planned action in which every step is guided by 
the01-y.""~ 
(5) Science cannotproduceabsolutely certain, only tentative, results. This 
is a most important characteristic of science because it anticipates 
postmodernity. "The old scientific idea of episteme-of absolutely certain, 
demonstrable knowledge-has proved to be an idol. The demand for 
scientific objectivity makes it inevitable that every scientific statement 
must remain tentative forever. It may indeed be corroborated, but every 
corroboration is relative to other statements which, again, are tentative. 
Popper, 278. 
12'Ibid., 279. 
"'Ibid., 280. 
lZ9Ibid. 
Only in our subjective experience of conviction in our subjective faith, 
can we be 'absolutely certain'" (emphasis original).130 "The wrong view of 
science betrays itself in the craving to be right; for it is not his possession 
of knowledge, of irrefutable truth, that makes the man of science, but his 
persistent and recklessly critical quest for truth.""' 
